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1. Introduction
Both R. v. Marshall1 and R. v. Bernard1 began as relatively minor prosecutions for 
breaches of regulatory statutes. In this, they were not remarkable as most of the 
leading cases in this field began from such prosecutions. In R. v. Sparrow3 the 
fishing net was too long; in R. v. Badger4 the First Nation hunters were on private 
land; in R. v. Van der Peet5 ten salmon were sold without a licence; in R. v. Marshall 
(fishingf $700 of eels were sold without a licence; in R. v. Powley7 a Métis person 
shot a moose for food without a licence. It is rare, outside of the Aboriginal context, 
for offences such as these to be considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Convictions usually result in relatively light non-penal penalties and most cases are 
settled through plea bargains before they go to trial.
Summary prosecutions dealing with Aboriginal and treaty rights are unlike 
other summary prosecutions because a finding of guilt or innocence requires 
consideration of larger issues relating to territory, priority for the use of resources 
and the legal framework for exercising those rights. It is for these reasons that
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1 [2005] 3 C.N.L.R. 214, 2005 SCC 43 [Marshall and Bernard cited to C.N.L.R.], rev’g (2003), 218 
N.S.R. (2d) 78, [2004] 1 C.N.L.R. 211 (C.A.) cited to N.S.R.; rev’g (2002), 202 N.S.R. (2d) 42, [2002] 3 
C.N.L.R. 176 (S.C.) cited to N.S.R.]; a f f  g (2001), 191 N.S.R. (2d) 323, [2001] 2 C.N.L.R. 256 (Prov. Ct.) 
[Marshall (logging) cited to N.S.R.].
2 [2005] 3 C.N.L.R. 214, 2005 SCC 43 [Marshall and Bernard cited to C.N.L.R.], rev’g (2003) 262 
N.B.R. (2d) 1, [2003] 4 C.N.L.R. 48 (C.A.) cited to N.B.R.]; rev’g (2001) 239 N.B.R. (2d) 173, [2002] 3 
C.N.L.R. 141 (Q.B.) cited to N.B.R.]; a f f  g [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 184, N.B.J. No. 138 (Prov. Ct.) [cited to 
N.B.R.].
3 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 3 C.N.L.R. 160 [Sparrow  cited to S.C.R.].
4 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, 2 C.N.L.R. 77.
5 (sub. nom. R. v. Van der Peet) [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 4 C.N.L.R. 177 [7?. v. Van der Peet cited to S.C.R.].
6 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 4 C.N.L.R. 161 [Marshall (fishing) cited to S.C.R.].
7 [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, 4 C.N.L.R. 321 [Powley cited to S.C.R.].
Justice LeBel at the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard and 
Justice Robertson at the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in R. v. Bernard expressed 
concerns about the appropriateness of adjudicating issues related to Aboriginal and 
treaty rights in summary conviction proceedings. The two judges pointed out that 
such proceedings are designed to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused 
individual; they are not designed to address Aboriginal title to territory that may 
encompass an entire province nor to determine the ramifications for decisions about 
resource allocation among individuals and corporations who are not parties to the 
proceedings.
The complexity of accommodating Aboriginal and treaty rights in a 
contemporary context where such rights had been ignored for so long leads courts to 
suggest that negotiations are a more appropriate way forward than litigation. In 
Bernard, Justice Daigle of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal observed:
In my view, the larger question looming behind the issues of the 
reconciliation of aboriginal title and the interests of other title 
holders, including issues of extinguishment of aboriginal title by 
the granting of fee simple titles or entitlement to compensation, 
should not be addressed in a piecemeal fashion before the courts.
The fundamental principle that must guide the resolution of these 
issues is that the rights asserted must be considered in relation to 
the competing rights and interests of others. As suggested by 
several courts in Canada, only subsequent negotiations bringing 
together all the parties who have a stake in the resolution of these 
complex issues can be truly fruitful and lead to just settlements.10
In spite of the courts’ exhortations to the parties to negotiate, judges often 
find themselves being asked to determine the existence and scope of Aboriginal or 
treaty rights. This is because the Crown or the Aboriginal party may not be eager to 
enter into such negotiations without a Court ruling that establishes the existence of a 
right, or because the parties have been unable to reach agreement in negotiations. 
Justice LeBel suggests that if an Aboriginal or treaty rights issue comes to trial in the 
context of a summary conviction prosecution, the Aboriginal accused should “seek a 
temporary stay of the charges so that the aboriginal claim can be properly litigated in 
the civil courts.”11 Justice Robertson, in the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, 
imposed a stay of the effect of the decision recognizing the treaty right, in order to 
permit the parties to negotiate a resolution.12
8 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at paras. 142-44.
9 Bernard  (C.A.), supra note 2 at paras. 314-24.
10 Ibid. at para. 210. See also Scanlan J. in Marshall (logging) (S.C.) supra note 1.
11 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para. 144.
12 Bernard (C .A .), supra note 2 at para. 552.
This paper considers the suggestions made by Justice LeBel and Justice 
Robertson with respect to the suggested procedure. Staying a proceeding or the 
effect of a decision raises immediate issues related to the status of other similar 
charges, the allocation of the resource while the matter is winding its ways through 
the courts, and the funding necessary in order to enable the Aboriginal party to 
participate in the proceedings. As I argue, current jurisprudence from the Supreme 
Court of Canada could be developed to address these concerns. Justice LeBel’s 
primary concern, however, is not procedure, but rather that “[t]he question of 
aboriginal title and access to resources in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia is a 
complex issue that is of great importance to all the residents and communities of the 
provinces” in which “all interested parties should have the opportunity to participate 
in any litigation or negotiations.”13 I argue that to meet the concerns of such 
“interested parties,”14 there must be a change in the application of the legal test used 
to determine Aboriginal and treaty rights. In recent cases, courts have been relying 
on the interpretation of events in the past to determine contemporary allocation of 
resources. This approach does not do justice either to the reading of history or to the 
contemporary interests of the parties who will be affected by the decisions. I argue 
that it is necessary to separate out the exercise of determining the historical bases for 
Aboriginal and treaty rights from the exercise of determining the nature of 
contemporary accommodation. I conclude that if this separation occurs, it will open 
an opportunity to establish a bi-national panel that could develop an approach to 
history that would incorporate both settler and Aboriginal experiences.
2. An “inadequate and inappropriate” process
Justice LeBel in the Supreme Court and Justice Robertson in the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal raised several issues related to procedure and evidence which, in the 
words of Justice LeBel, made summary conviction proceedings “inadequate and 
inappropriate.”15 Both judges felt that the more fulsome pre-trial requirements of 
civil proceedings would be more appropriate for adjudicating Aboriginal and treaty 
rights. Criminal trials require disclosure by the Crown but not by the defence. 
Justice Robertson expressed
... great sympathy for the Crown’s plea that it is simply unfair to 
permit the defence of Aboriginal title to be raised in summary 
conviction proceedings where none of the procedural safeguards 
employed in the civil sphere is available. For example, there has
13 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para. 146.
14 I do not believe Justice LeBel contemplated having public hearings where any individual could 
participate in the proceeding. The Aboriginal party and the Crown should have the responsibility for 
mediating the interests o f  those they claim to represent. This means that the Crown should as a rule 
represent the “interested parties.” For a discussion o f  techniques on “chains” and “networks” needed to 
provide advice to the parties at the table, see Dean G. Pruitt & Peter J. Camevale, Negotiation in Social 
Conflict (Pacific Grove, CA: Pacific Grove, 1993) at 154-63.
15 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para. 143.
been no exchange of pleadings and an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses before trial.16
Both judges also expressed concern about having different levels of proof in a 
criminal proceeding. In a prosecution, ordinarily the Crown must prove the elements 
of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. In the usual course, summary conviction 
proceedings for breach of a regulatory statute might take half a day or a day. When 
the accused raise an Aboriginal or treaty rights defence, the process is a little 
different. Usually, the main elements of the offence are admitted so that the trial is 
really a different type of proceeding not accounted for in the rules of criminal 
practice. The accused open their defence by proving the existence of the Aboriginal 
or treaty right, on the balance of probabilities. They must then show, again on the 
balance of probabilities, that the legislation under which they were charged infringes 
the claimed Aboriginal or treaty right. At this point, the burden shifts to the Crown 
to show that there has been a “clear and plain” intention to extinguish the right.
The problem of different levels or burdens of proof in the same proceeding 
is exacerbated by the type of evidence needed to establish the existence of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. Rather than the forensic or medical evidence 
commonly introduced in a summary conviction proceeding, Aboriginal and treaty 
rights cases may require introduction of evidence from voluminous documents, oral 
histories, archaeology, anthropology, ethno-history and descriptions of cultural 
practices. In consequence, trials will require more hearing days spread over a longer 
period. The Bernard trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court required 29 hearing 
days spread over two years, with five expert witnesses and 600 documents. In 
Marshall (logging), there were several interlocutory proceedings; the trial in the 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court was conducted over eighteen months, with six expert 
witnesses, 25,000 pages of exhibits and 9,000 pages of transcripts.17 An application 
by the Newfoundland government to remove cabins erected by members of the 
Miawpukek Band on Crown land required 47 days o f testimony and generated 
150,000 pages of historical material, with seven expert witnesses called by the 
Crown and five by the respondents, as well as four Mi’kmaq witnesses.18 The trial in 
R. v. Powley which established the existence of a Métis Aboriginal right, with three 
expert witnesses, required eleven days of hearings.19
The concerns expressed by LeBel J. and Robertson J.A. with respect to 
summary quasi-criminal proceedings have been noted by courts in summary civil 
proceedings as well. In Ontario (Minister o f Municipal Affairs and Housing) v.
16 Bernard (C.A.), supra note 2 at para. 314.
17 (2001) 191 N.S.R. (2d) 323 (Prov. Ct); for the interlocutory motions, see [2000] N.S.J. No. 465 (Prov. 
Ct.) (QL); [2001] N.S.J. No. 487 (Prov. Ct.) (QL); [2002] N.S.J. No. 154 (C.A.) (QL); [2002] N.S.J. No. 
449 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
18 Newfoundland (Minister o f  Government Services and Lands) v. D rew  (2003) 228 Nfld. & P E I R 1 
(N.L.S.C.).
19 R. v. Powley, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 (Prov. Ct.) per Vaillancourt J.
TransCanada Pipelines Ltd.,20 the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation sought judicial review of 
a proposal by the Ontario government to extend the boundaries of a northern 
municipality. The Nishnawbe Aski Nation argued that such an extension would 
prejudice treaty rights and land claims to the area and that, consequently, they were 
entitled to be consulted on the decision. They were successful at the Divisional 
Court21 but the Ontario Court of Appeal held that it would not enforce consultation 
until the Aboriginal or treaty rights in question had been established in judicial 
proceedings. The Court of Appeal declined to send the matter back to the Divisional 
Court because, in its view, such rights could not be established in proceedings of a 
summary nature such as judicial review.22 In another Ontario case, Keewatin v. 
Ontario (Ministry o f Natural Resources),23 the Grassy Narrows First Nation sought 
judicial review of a decision to allow clear cutting and the application of herbicides 
in the Whiskey Jack Forest by Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. Three trappers commenced 
the action in 2000. The Ontario Divisional Court dismissed the application and 
required that the First Nation commence a full civil action, citing the complexity of 
the evidence to be considered.
Whether Aboriginal parties raise Aboriginal or treaty rights in summary 
civil or quasi-criminal proceedings, generally they do so as a defensive response to 
some one else’s initiative.24 Two main factors explain Aboriginal peoples’ 
reluctance to initiate an application for a declaration defining their rights: money and 
time. A full civil trial is very expensive, requiring lawyers to engage in numerous 
interim proceedings, such as applications for injunctions, motions to strike parts (or 
all) of the pleadings, motions for particulars, and challenges to the admissibility of
20 [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 153, (sub nom. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Beardmore (Township)) 186 D.L.R. 
(4th) 403 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 264 (19 Oct. 2000) [TransCanada 
Pipelines cited to C.N.L.R.].
21 TransCanada Pipeline Ltd. v. Beardmore (Township), [1998] 2 C.N.L.R. 240, [1997] O.J. No. 5316 QL 
(Gen. Div.).
22 TransCanada Pipelines (C.A.), supra note 20 at para. 161.
23 Keewatin v. Ontario (Ministry o f  Natural Resources) (2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 370, [2003] O.J. No 2937 
(QL) at para. 59: “A great deal o f  evidence, including expert evidence, will be called by the parties on a 
number o f  disputed facts and issues, and it is inappropriate to deal with these disputes o f  material fact by 
way o f  summary application... Some o f  the disputed issues include: (a) the proper interpretation o f  the 
applicable provisions o f Treaty 3; (b) inferences to be drawn from the applicable legislative history; (c) the 
adverse effects, if  any, o f  logging operations on wildlife resources; (d) the nature and extent o f  benefits 
generated by logging activities in the area in question for both the general public and First Nations 
members; and (e) the nature and extent o f  consultations and discussions between the applicants, their First 
Nations community, and the respondents concerning the conduct o f the logging operations in question.”
24 In Bernard (C. A.), supra note 2 at para. 315 Robertson J.A. commented that “the defence o f  Aboriginal 
title has been converted into a summary proceeding for establishing Aboriginal title.” It should be noted 
that the Aboriginal parties are engaged in the summary proceedings because they are the accused in a 
prosecution initiated by the Crown. It is not accurate to say that the Aboriginal party is “converting” the 
summary conviction proceeding into something else merely because that party is raising a legitimate 
defence to a charge. Rather than prosecuting, the Crown could have sought an injunction based on the 
claim that the Aboriginal parties have no Aboriginal or treaty rights. Given that the Crown chose to 
prosecute, it can hardly complain that it is “unfair to permit the defence o f  Aboriginal title to be raised in 
summary conviction proceedings.” -  Ibid. at para. 314.
oral evidence. As noted above, these trials can also stretch across years, not just 
months. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,25 a proceeding asking for a declaration 
of the type contemplated by Justice LeBel, the First Nation parties asserted 
Aboriginal title over 58,000 sq km of northern British Columbia. The initial trial 
took almost three years, with 374 hearing days, 61 witnesses, 35,000 pages of 
transcripts, 50,000 pages of exhibits and a judgment of more than 400 pages. Eleven 
years elapsed between the beginning of the trial and the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 1997, sending the case back to be retried.
There are few sources of funding for such lengthy and expensive 
proceedings. Current Test Case Funding from the Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs is, in practice, restricted to appearances before the Supreme Court 
of Canada.26 In 2004-05 there was only $750,000 available for the ten to fifteen 
applications that were approved. In 2005-06, an increase of $250,000 was allocated 
for Métis claims. To put this amount into perspective, the Aboriginal plaintiffs in 
Delgamuukw were provided a total of $8 million.27 The federal Court Challenges 
Program, another source of funding for litigation, is limited to cases dealing with 
equality rights; the maximum for a trial is $20,000.28 Framing a case to fit within 
section 15 of the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms could mean sacrificing crucial 
aspects of an Aboriginal or treaty rights argument.29
25 The trial judgment by McEachem C.J.B.C. was delivered in 1990: [1991] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, 79 D.L.R. (4th) 
185 (B.C.S.C.) [Delgamuukw cited to C.N.L.R.]. The British Columbia Court o f  Appeal overturned the 
trial decision in 1993: [1993] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 [Delgamuukw cited to C.N.L.R.]. The 
Supreme Court o f Canada sent the case back for trial in 1997: [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1 C.N.L.R. 14 
[Delgamuukw cited to S.C.R.].
26 See Bruce H. Wildsmith, “Vindicating M i’Kmaq Rights: The Struggle before, During and After 
Marshall” (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 203 at 216-17.
27 The amount provided by the Test Case Funding program for Delgamuukw  was exceptional in that 
funding was provided from the trial through to the Supreme Court o f  Canada hearings. (Personal 
conversation with Rami Shoucri and Tom Malloch, Test Case Funding Program, Department o f Indian 
and Northern Affairs, 12 January 2006.) To put the costs for Delgamuukw  into perspective, the 
prosecution and defence in the Air India trial each spent about $22 million. (British Columbia Ministry o f  
the Attorney General, Information Bulletin, 2005AG0036-001081, “Statement o f  Expenditures for the Air 
India Trial” (23 Nov. 2005) online: Province o f  British Columbia, <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/ 
news_releases_2005-2009/2005AG0036-001081.htm>, accessed: 2 Feb. 2006.
28 Aboriginal Rights Court Challenges Program, online: <http://www.justice.gov.nt.ca/ARCCP>.
29 Larry Chartrand, “Re-Conceptualizing Equality: A Place for Indigenous Political Identity” (2001) 19 
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 243 at 252:
Quite often, lawyers representing Aboriginal peoples are forced, due to lack o f  
financial resources o f  the client, to pigeon hole their claims into (or tack onto their 
other substantive claims) a section 15 analysis in order to fall within the criteria o f  
the Court Challenges Program. The implications o f this are significant. Resources 
are spent developing and managing the section 15 aspect o f  the case, perhaps at the 
expense o f  developing legal arguments supporting substantive Aboriginal rights 
claims. Consequently, the necessary attention needed to promote a thorough case 
on Aboriginal rights may not be provided. This could result in a failure to secure a 
just result and perhaps result in the creation o f  a bad precedent due to the 
advancement o f  ineffective argument or evidence to properly support the 
Aboriginal rights claim.
In New Brunswick, where the Bernard case arose, civil legal aid funding is 
limited to a narrow range o f family law cases, while criminal legal aid is not 
generally available unless incarceration is a likely result of a conviction. When two 
Mi’kmaq fishers requested state funded counsel to raise a treaty defence to a fishing 
charge, the Director of the provincial legal aid plan testified that the plan would go 
bankrupt if it were to fund such cases.30 The accused were denied a stay of 
proceedings until the Crown provided funding for counsel, even though the evidence 
showed that the accused did not have
... the financial resources to fund an extensive legal battle 
involving treaty rights which could, according to the evidence 
before the Provincial Court Judge, see legal costs exceed 
$1,000,000.00. Some of the Respondents were working, earning in 
the range of $300.00 to $350.00 a week, while others were on 
Employment Insurance Benefits or Social Assistance. One 
Respondent has recently retired from the Canadian Armed Forces 
after twenty years of service.31
Currently, then, there are almost no programs to fund a civil action for a 
declaration of Aboriginal or treaty rights of the kind proposed by Justice LeBel. It is 
therefore incumbent on courts to ensure that such funding is available. The Supreme 
Court recognized that Aboriginal parties would be prejudiced by lack of funding to 
pursue civil proceedings and in British Columbia (Minister o f Forests) v. Okanagan 
Indian Band,32 ordered costs in advance of the cause. The Adams Lake, 
Spallumcheen, Neskonlith and Okanagan Bands began logging on their traditional 
territory to harvest timber for housing in their communities. Because they did not 
have authorization under British Columbia’s Forest Practices Code, the province 
brought proceedings to stop the logging. Sigurdson J. of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court ordered that the matter go to a full trial, without ordering that the 
Crown pay costs in advance, even though the Crown did not dispute the First 
Nations’ claim that they could not afford the cost, which their counsel estimated 
would be $814,010. The majority of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada 
upheld the Court of Appeal’s order that the Crown pay interim costs to the Bands. 
The usual rules on costs were superseded by “other policy objectives, notably that of 
ensuring that ordinary citizens will have access to the courts to determine their 
constitutional rights and other issues of broad social significance.”33 The majority 
established three criteria for determining when to award interim costs:
30 R. v Bartibogue, [2002] 4 C.N.L.R. 209; 250 N.B.R. (2d) 73 (Q.B.) [Bartibogue, cited to C.N.L.R.] at 
para. 15.
31 Ibid. at para. 16. In some other provinces, there may be limited funding available for summary 
conviction cases.
32 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, [2004] 1 C.N.L.R. 7 [Okanagan cited to S.C.R.].
33 Ibid. at para. 38.
(i) The party seeking interim costs genuinely cannot afford to pay 
for the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing 
the issues to trial — in short, the litigation could not proceed if the 
order were not made.
(ii) The claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious; that is, 
the claim is at least of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the 
interests of justice for the opportunity to pursue the case to be 
forfeited because the litigant lacks financial means.
(iii) The issues raised transcend the individual interests of the 
particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been 
resolved in previous cases.34
These principles could be applied to situations where the Crown requests a stay in a 
criminal proceeding so that the Aboriginal party can commence a civil action.
Even if Aboriginal parties could fund a civil action to establish Aboriginal 
or treaty rights, what would happen in the decade or so that would elapse while the 
case worked its way through the courts? If the charge against Joshua Bernard had 
been stayed, and other Aboriginal people had begun cutting logs, would the Crown 
stay the new charges as well? This would leave the Crown without effective 
management power. Conversely, if, as Justice Robertson ruled, an acquittal is 
stayed, would the Crown continue to lay charges against other Aboriginal peoples 
who exercise their Aboriginal or treaty rights, while non-Aboriginals infringe on 
their rights? For Aboriginal people like those at Grassy Narrows, waiting a decade 
while their forests are clear-cut is not an option if they want to preserve trapping 
rights. The balancing of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests during this period 
would be very important and very difficult.
The Ontario Court of Appeal and the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
approached this issue in different ways. The Ontario Court of Appeal in both the 
TransCanada Piplines case and the Keewatin case invoked the prejudice to non- 
Aboriginal parties to justify quashing the summary judicial review application. In 
TransCanada Piplines Borins J. noted that the residents of the municipality would 
suffer “a serious injustice” if there were further delay in extending the boundaries of 
the municipality.35 In Keewatin, Then J. cited the detrimental effect on the local 
economy of a finding in favour of the First Nation.36 In neither case did the judges
34 Ibid. at para. 40.
35 TransCanada Pipelines (C.A.), supra note 20 at para. 161.
36 Keewatin v. Ontario (Ministry o f  Natural Resources) (2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 370, [2003] O.J. No 2937 
(QL) at para. 60: “Furthermore, the determination o f  issues, if  decided in the applicants’ favour, will have 
a profound impact on the lives and business o f  the people living in those areas o f  Northwestern Ontario 
subject to Treaty 3, including Abitibi and its employees. The economies o f  the communities will also be 
greatly affected. It would also have an impact in forest management units that are located in, or overlap, 
Treaty 3 or Keewatin lands.”
consider the prejudice to the Aboriginal party with respect to funding or delay. 
While the decisions to require a fuller hearing for these matters is understandable, 
ignoring the short-term consequences does not always produce the wanted result. 
For example, in Grassy Narrows, after the quashing of the judicial review in 2002, 
members of the First Nation set up and maintained permanent road blockades.37
The Court of Appeal in British Columbia, in contrast, ruled in Haida Nation 
v. British Columbia38 that the Crown must respect asserted Aboriginal rights even 
before those rights have been judicially determined. The Haida live on Haida Gwaii 
(the Queen Charlotte Islands) off the coast of British Columbia. They have never 
signed a treaty or surrendered their lands. The British Columbia government issued 
logging licences to the area without considering the impact of the licences on Haida 
rights in their traditional territory and without consulting with the Haida, arguing that 
it had no obligation to consult or to consider the evidence of Aboriginal rights prior 
to a judicial determination that such rights existed. The Supreme Court of Canada, 
affirming the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, found that the 
Crown has an obligation to consult when it “has knowledge, real or constructive, of 
the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that 
might adversely affect it.”39 The nature and extent of the consultation depends on 
three factors: the strength of the prima facie case; the extent of the right claimed; and 
the potential for harm from the infringement.40
The duty to consult is not a requirement to reach an agreement, and so it 
does not give the Aboriginal objectors a veto over development. However, the Court 
ruled that:
... the effect of good faith consultation may be to reveal a duty to 
accommodate. Where a strong prima facie case exists for the 
claim, and the consequences of the government’s proposed 
decision may adversely affect it in a significant way, addressing 
the Aboriginal concerns may require taking steps to avoid 
irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement, 
pending final resolution of the underlying claim.41
37 At the time o f writing the blockades had been up for three years. Abitibi-Consolidated decided to close 
its sawmill in 2005 and with the downturn in the lumbering industry it is not clear what will happen. See 
Mike Aiken, “Grassy blockade members join calls for sanctions against Abitibi” Miner and News, 20 
December 2005, Kenora, Ontario, online: <http:www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/>
38 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister o f  Forests), [2002] 2 C.N.L.R. 121 (B.C.C.A.).
39 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister o f  Forests), [2005] 1 C.N.L.R. 72, 2004 SCC 73 [Haida 
Nation cited to C.N.L.R.] at para. 35. For the application o f  these principles in the treaty context, see 
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister o f  Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69.
40 Ibid. at paras. 42-47.
41 Ibid. at para. 47.
The “accommodation,” however, must also take into account other societal concerns.
Balance and compromise are inherent in the notion of 
reconciliation. Where accommodation is required in making 
decisions that may adversely affect as yet unproven Aboriginal 
rights and title claims, the Crown must balance Aboriginal 
concerns reasonably with the potential impact of the decision on 
the asserted right or title and with other societal interests.42
The principles of Haida Nation could be applied to achieve a compromise 
status quo during a stay of quasi-criminal prosecutions ordered to allow a civil trial 
o f the Aboriginal and treaty rights questions. Governments can accommodate rights 
despite the lack of judicial recognition of those rights. In R. v. Peter Paul,43 a New 
Brunswick case involving charges on illegal logging on Crown land, the provincial 
government negotiated logging agreements with Aboriginal people while appealing 
Peter Paul’s acquittal; the government maintained the agreements even after the 
Court of Appeal substituted a conviction.44
In conclusion, if summary proceedings are inappropriate to deal with 
Aboriginal and treaty rights, courts must ensure that the Aboriginal parties have the 
wherewithal to participate in a more fulsome and lengthy process. Given the lack of 
funding programs for this kind of litigation, especially at the trial level, courts will 
have to extend principles for providing costs in advance first articulated in British 
Columbia (Minister o f Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band. In addition, judges must 
consider the reality of the prejudice to Aboriginal parties as well as non-Aboriginal 
parties while the matter is being resolved. This would suggest that the principles 
developed in Haida Nation v. British Columbia should be extended to cover 
situations where Aboriginal and treaty rights are being litigated in summary criminal 
or quasi-criminal proceedings.
3. The Colour of God’s Shoes
The practical problems of lack of funding and prejudice from delay are thus not 
insurmountable, but there remains a fundamental problem with the judicial approach 
to adjudication of Aboriginal and treaty rights. I try to explain this problem to law 
students using an exercise called “the colour of God’s shoes”. I ask my audience to 
pretend that I am a judge who needs an answer to a simple question: “What is the 
colour of God’s shoes?”. Here are some of the answers students have given me: 
“black, of course; brown; the colours of the rainbow; the colours of compassion; my
42 Ibid. at para. 50.
43 R. v. Peter Paul (1998), {sub nom. R. v. Paul) 196 N.B.R. (2d) 292, [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 221 (N.B.C.A.) 
rev’g (1997), (sub nom. R. v. Paul) 193 N.B.R. (2d) 321, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 131 (Q.B.), a f fg  (1996), (sub 
nom. R. v. Paul) 182 N.B.R. (2d) 270, [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 221 (Prov. Ct.).
44 Margaret McCallum, “Rights in the Courts, on the Water and in the Woods: The Aftermath o f  R. v. 
Marshall in New Brunswick” (2004) 38 Journal o f Canadian Studies 204 [“Rights”].
God doesn’t wear shoes; God wears sandals, unless golfing; She doesn’t have shoes; 
I don’t think he has feet.” What do these answers tell the judge about the audience? 
Not very much. First, there is no agreement on the colour of God’s shoes, or even on 
whether God wears shoes, has feet, or is male, female or neither. Second, some of 
the answers suggest a lack appreciation of the importance of the question itself. The 
answers would leave the judge with a very poor impression of the audience.
In writing their responses, most of the students realize that an answer is 
impossible because there is nothing in their culture or background to help them. Yet 
most of them accept the hypothetical judge’s premise that God wears shoes, and try 
to give an answer based on their reaction to the question. It is ironic that students’ 
efforts to be co-operative and answer the question on the judge’s own terms add to 
the incoherence of the collective response. So the judge does not learn anything 
from the scores of answers to the question. Yet the audience learns that, in the 
judge’s world, there is a God, God is anthropomorphic, and God wears shoes. They 
learn as well that the judge assumes that his God is the only God, that the question of 
the colour of God’s shoes is important to his people, and that the judge assumes that 
it is important for all other people as well.
Now, let us substitute a Canadian judge for the hypothetical judge, turn the 
audience into Aboriginal peoples, and change the question to “What are your laws on 
property?” To the mainstream system, land is a commodity that can be owned, 
bought, and sold. Terms like exclusive possession, trespass and fee simple are terms 
of art that have developed over hundreds of years in the common law. Some 
Canadian judges, however, assume that they can take the answers given by 
Aboriginal peoples to judges’ questions about property and make a determination 
about Aboriginal title on that basis. According to former Chief Justice Lamer:
... the aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may 
have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such 
that the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence against 
exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which permission may 
be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even 
temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive 
occupation.45
First Nations, however, may have different concepts that cannot be accommodated 
within the confines of common law legal categories. How can the concept of Mother 
Earth be reconciled with the idea of fee simple?46 Thus, judges may reject answers 
as nonsensical or irrelevant when, from the perspective of the person being 
questioned, it is the question that is nonsensical or irrelevant.
45 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 25 at para. 157, per Lamer C.J.C.
46 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, “Restructuring the Relationship” in Report, Vol.2 Part 2, 
at 421-63.
Chief Justice McEachem, the trial judge in Delgamuukw, assumed that his 
civilization provided the universal standard for determining property relations and 
the universal standard for hearing evidence on such matters. He apparently was 
impatient listening to non-conventional forms of evidence such as oral histories and 
singing.47 Because First Nations societies did not have the same institutions, 
governmental structure, or technology, the Chief Justice assumed that they did not 
have law, social fabric or humanity:
It would not be accurate to assume that even pre-contact existence 
in the territory was in the least bit idyllic. The plaintiffs ancestors 
had no written language, no horses or wheeled vehicles, slavery 
and starvation were not uncommon, wars with neighbouring 
peoples were common, and there is no doubt, to quote Hobbes, that 
aboriginal life in the territory was, at best, “nasty, brutish and 
short.”48
Chief Justice McEachem concluded that “[the First Nation people] more 
likely acted as they did because of survival instincts”.49 So, if being able to identify 
the colour of God’s shoes was central to the definition of civilization for the 
hypothetical jurist, the answers of the law students, according to Chief Justice 
McEachem’s reasoning, would have revealed them as a lower form of life, loping 
from class to class, relying on their survival instincts to make it through the next set 
of exams.
Chief Justice McEachem is not representative of judicial attitudes today and 
his views were firmly rejected by both the British Columbia Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Nonetheless judges continue to struggle to appreciate 
what they call the “Aboriginal perspective.” The challenges are revealed in 
Marshall/Bernard in the different approaches of the Chief Justice and LeBel J. to 
defining Aboriginal title. According to Chief Justice McLachlin:
The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice [claimed as 
the basis of the Aboriginal right] from the perspective of the 
aboriginal people. But in translating it to a common law right, the 
Court must also consider the European perspective; the nature of 
the right at common law must be examined to determine whether a
47 Dara Culhane, The Pleasure of the Crown: Anthropology, Law and First Nations (Bumaby, BC: Talon 
Books, 1998) at 123:
... As the Chiefs’ testimonies proceeded, [Chief Justice McEachem] became 
increasingly impatient about having to actually listen to the oral histories. He took 
exception, particularly, to witnesses singing in court. “This is a trial,” he 
reproached an Elder at one point, “not a performance.” Besides, he added, the 
significance o f  the music was lost on him as he had “a tin ear.”
48 Delgamuukw (S.C.), supra note 25 at para. 111.
49 Ibid. at para. 1343.
particular aboriginal practice fits it. This exercise in translating 
aboriginal practices to modem rights must not be conducted in a 
formalistic or narrow way. The Court should take a generous view 
of the aboriginal practice and should not insist on exact conformity 
to the precise legal parameters of the common law right. The 
question is whether the practice corresponds to the core concepts 
of the legal right claimed.50
Justice LeBel, on the other hand, recognized that the court must try to 
understand Aboriginal concepts within their own context, and not as translated into a 
common law equivalent:
In my view, aboriginal conceptions of territoriality, land-use and 
property should be used to modify and adapt the traditional 
common law concepts of property in order to develop an 
occupancy standard that incorporates both the aboriginal and 
common law approaches. Otherwise, we might be implicitly 
accepting the position that aboriginal peoples had no rights in land 
prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty because their views of 
property or land use do not fit within Euro-centric conceptions of 
property rights.51
The difficulty in seeing matters from the “Aboriginal perspective” is 
exacerbated by the fact that courts are not trying to understand history on its own 
terms, for what it tells us about how people lived in other times and places, but rather 
trying to use history to determine the legal rules for making decisions on 
contemporary resource allocation.
4. The Uses of History
Cases on Aboriginal and treaty rights may turn on evidence of events of three 
hundred or four hundred years ago. With Aboriginal rights, courts must determine 
what activities were integral to an Aboriginal society prior to contact with 
Europeans.52 When the right claimed is the right to Aboriginal title, courts must 
determine whether the Aboriginal group had exclusive occupation of the territory 
claimed at the time of assertion of Crown sovereignty.53 With Métis rights, courts 
must determine the nature of the activity at the time that the European sovereign 
power “effectively established political and legal control” in the area at issue.54 In 
interpreting treaty rights, courts must determine what was in the contemplation of the
50 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para. 48.
51 Ibid. at para. 127.
52 See Van der Peet, supra note 5.
53 See Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 25.
54 See Powley (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at para 37.
parties when they signed the treaty.55 In making these determinations, courts depend 
on evidence of conventionally-trained experts in many disciplines, as well as 
evidence from expert Aboriginal people who can recount oral history and the laws of 
the Aboriginal nation. When rights claimants advance more than one claim -  
Aboriginal title and treaty rights, for example -  they must support their claims with 
evidence from two different time periods.
But Aboriginal and treaty rights cases deal as well with contemporary 
realities and challenging public policy issues, including the continued viability of 
Aboriginal peoples, the de facto  presence of many competing non-Aboriginal 
interests, and the allocation of resources among them. Effective resolution of these 
issues requires a balancing of disparate interests as well as government financial 
obligations. Justice Robertson addressed the issue directly in his reasons for decision 
in Bernard:
Though we are not asked to make declarations as to legal rights, 
nor could we in the context of quasi-criminal proceedings, any 
ruling on Mr. Bernard’s two defences impacts on both natives and 
non-natives in this Province; as did the Marshall decisions. It is 
trite to acknowledge that the linchpin of New Brunswick’s 
economy is tied to two of its natural resources: fish and timber.56
Resolving complex questions of what happened in the past and of 
contemporary resource allocation becomes more difficult when courts collapse the 
two questions into one. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Mitchell illustrates this approach.57 In Mitchell, Grand Chief Mike Mitchell of 
Akwesasne claimed that the Mohawks had an Aboriginal right to trade with other 
First Nations, extending throughout the traditional trading territory of the Mohawks 
in what is now upper New York State and Ontario. Mitchell argued that the 
requirement to pay duty when crossing the international border was an infringement 
of the Aboriginal right to trade. The Supreme Court rejected the claim, saying that 
there was insufficient evidence of trade across the St. Lawrence prior to contact with 
Europeans to establish the right to that trade as an Aboriginal right. However, in 
rejecting the Mohawks’ argument that they would limit their trading partners to First 
Nations in Ontario and Quebec, McLachlin C.J. revealed that she was concerned 
about more than legal principles:
... it is difficult to imagine how limitations on trading partners 
would operate in practice. If Chief Mitchell trades goods to First 
Nations in Ontario and Quebec, there is nothing to prevent them 
from trading the goods with anyone else in Canada, aboriginal or
55 See Marshall (fishing), supra note 6.
56 Bernard (C.A.), supra note 2 at para. 352.
57 Mitchell v. Minister o f National Revenue, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 3 C.N.L.R. 122 [Mitchell, cited to 
S.C.R.].
not. Thus, the limitations placed on the trading right by Chief 
Mitchell and the courts below artificially narrow the claimed right 
and would, at any rate, prove illusory in practice.58
This concern, however valid, is not about the sufficiency of evidence of trade in pre­
contact Mohawk society, but about how that trade might be conducted in a 
contemporary context. In his concurring judgment in Mitchell, Binnie J. also 
expressed concerns about current trading possibilities that were not directly related to 
the legal principle at issue:
The [intervenor, the] Attorney General for New Brunswick argues 
that the claimed aboriginal right really amounts to no more than an 
aboriginal cross-border link to facilitate trade in non-aboriginal 
goods between non-aboriginal communities. There was, on the 
evidence, nothing to prevent the Tyendinaga Mohawks from re­
selling the goods to non-natives.59
The problem in both Mitchell and Marshall and Bernard is that courts are 
interpreting history with an eye to the contemporary implications of their 
interpretation. This approach inhibits full understanding of the historical record and 
thus is an impediment to achieving a contemporary accommodation of historically 
acquired rights and modem resource management regimes. It is history which gives 
context and provides the contours to Aboriginal and treaty rights, and that history 
should not be burdened with the responsibility of determining the allocation of 
resources between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people three or four hundred years 
later.
The danger of interpreting history to justify the present is illustrated by the 
Australian case of Milirrpum v. Nablaco Pty. Ltd.,60 which found, as a matter of law, 
that Australia was terra nullius when the Europeans came. This historical finding 
was important to ensure that contemporary Australian society would not have to deal 
with the actual historical presence of the aborigines.61 Contemporary decisions of 
Canadian courts do not espouse the doctrine of terra nullius, but the use of history in 
some cases, although more nuanced, is in danger of wandering into the same 
territory.
58 Ibid. at para. 20.
59 Ibid. at para. 94. In principle, this problem is no different than allowing Canadians to bring in tax free 
goods, as such goods could also be re-sold. The problem is not with the principle, then, but rather with 
issues such as the amount and types o f  goods that could be brought in. There is no indication in the 
decision that the Court considered any information on whether it would be possible to establish a workable 
scheme.
60 Milirrpum v. Nablaco Pty. Ltd., [1971] 17 F.L.R. 141 (N.T.S.C.).
61 This case was reversed in Mabo v. Queensland [No.2] (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1 (H.C. Aust,), beginning a 
new era in Australian law in which both courts and legislatures were required to confront the realities o f  
Native Title.
The disconnect between the historical record and the legal meaning of that 
record can only lead to suspicion and cynicism about the judicial process itself. In 
Bernard, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected Joshua Bernard’s claim 
that his nation had Aboriginal title to the area in New Brunswick where he was 
harvesting logs, holding that there was insufficient evidence of Aboriginal 
occupation of the cutting site at the time of the assertion of British sovereignty. Yet 
the cutting site was only fourteen or fifteen kilometres from the Augustine Mound 
archaeological site and six or seven kilometres from the Red Bank reserve, in a 
watershed occupied for at least three thousand years by Aboriginal peoples.62 With 
respect to the claim to Aboriginal title raised in the Marshall case from Nova Scotia, 
the Chief Justice suggested that seasonal use of an area for hunting or fishing was not 
enough to establish Aboriginal title because once the season was over, the Aboriginal 
peoples “left, and land could be traversed and used by anyone.”63 Thus, Aboriginal 
people must prove actual intensive year-round use to establish their right to their 
traditional lands, while the Crown’s claim to sovereignty is based on nothing more 
than an assertion of dominion over large areas that no European had yet traversed. 
That the European population was sparse and could not enforce exclusive possession 
has not been a barrier to the recognition of Crown sovereignty whereas it is, 
apparently, a barrier for the assertion of Aboriginal title.64
The problem of a constrained reading of the historical record is 
compounded by the constraints of the record itself. Courts find their historical 
“facts” on the basis of evidence presented to them, but new research and new 
interpretations change the historical “facts.” Scanlan J. of the Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court noted in Marshall (logging) that:
[Historians and anthropologists are constantly uncovering new 
materials. ... In cases which involve historical findings of fact the 
court must be cautious, keeping in mind that the experts then 
before the court may not have the final word as to the materials 
available to them and upon which they formulate their opinions. In 
that sense findings of historical fact must be recognized as being 
fluid, not frozen in time.65
62 See comments o f  Daigle J.A. in Bernard (C.A.), supra note 2 at paras. 116-19
63 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para. 58, per McLachlin C.J.C.: “However, more typically, 
seasonal hunting and fishing rights exercised in a particular area will translate to a hunting or fishing right. 
This is plain from this Court’s decisions in Van der Peet, Nikal, Adams and Côté. In those cases, 
aboriginal peoples asserted and proved ancestral utilization o f  particular sites for fishing and harvesting 
the products o f  the sea. Their forebears had come back to the same place to fish or harvest each year since 
time immemorial. However, the season over, they left, and the land could be traversed and used by 
anyone. These facts gave rise not to aboriginal title, but to aboriginal hunting and fishing rights.”
64 Bernard (Prov. Ct.), supra note 2 at para. 110, per Lordon J.: “There was no evidence o f  capacity to 
retain exclusive control and, given the vast area o f  land and the small population, they [the M i’kmaq] did 
not have the capacity to exercise exclusive control.”
65 Marshall (logging) (S.C.), supra note 1 at para. 16, per Scanlan J.
If the historical record changes, what will happen to the contemporary 
accommodation? In the Mitchell case on duty free transport of goods, would new 
evidence of trade across the St. Lawrence result in the lifting of duties for Mohawks 
trading with First Nations in Ontario and Quebec? In Marshall/Bernard, would new 
evidence indicating extensive use of the cutting sites prove Aboriginal title and the 
right to sell logs?
In conclusion, then, there are fundamental problems with the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s approach to the “Aboriginal perspective” and to history. The 
Chief Justice and the majority of the Court insist on using common law categories as 
a filter to understand the “Aboriginal perspective.” This tends to refract and splinter 
Aboriginal reality into western concepts. The fragmentation is made worse by the 
requirement imposed on history to somehow come up with the “right answer” to 
justify contemporary allocation of resources. This is manifest in Marshall/Bernard 
in the reluctance of the majority to recognize the existence of Aboriginal title, 
embedded in part in the Court’s concern to ensure that the contemporary interests of 
third parties are addressed in any adjudication.
5. Justifying and Justification
A straightforward way out of this conundrum would distinguish two distinct 
processes: the inquiry into the meaning of the historical record and the inquiry into 
the legal framework for contemporary resource allocation. This could by done 
through a more vigorous use of the justification stage of the Sparrow test.66 Under 
that test, if a court recognizes the existence of an Aboriginal right, the Crown can 
still attempt to justify any infringement of that right. The justification stage of the 
Sparrow test gives enormous power to the Crown and the courts. In R. v. 
Gladstone,61 the Court found that the Heiltsuk First Nation had historically traded in 
herring spawn on kelp and that the historical record supported a finding of an 
Aboriginal right to engage in the commercial trade in herring spawn on kelp. 
However, Lamer CJ held that the Crown could justify an infringement of this right 
for a wide range of reasons, including, “the pursuit of economic and regional 
fairness, and the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the 
fishery by non-aboriginal groups.”68 In my view, these bases for justifying an 
infringement are far too wide and the power to rule that an infringement is justified 
should be exercised with restraint.69 Nonetheless, their existence demonstrates that 
courts have the tools necessary to determine the principles for allocating resources 
based on contemporary realities.
66 Sparrow, supra note 3 at 1119 [cited to S.C.R.].
67 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, 4 C.N.L.R. 65 [Gladstone, cited to S.C.R.].
68 Ibid. at para. 75.
69 See Shin Imai, “Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The ‘Tracts Taken Up’ Provisions” (2001) 27 
Queen’s L.J. 1 at 18-19.
Some judges, however, seem reluctant to find that a right has been 
infringed, and so their analysis stops short of the justification stage.70 This 
reluctance may result from the unexpected consequences of the earlier Supreme 
Court decision in Marshall (fishing).11 After the Supreme Court recognized Donald 
Marshall’s treaty right to sell eels for a moderate livelihood, First Nations in the 
Maritimes asserted treaty rights to harvest lumber and lobster. Violence followed as 
some First Nations pursued their right to fish, defying some non-Aboriginal fishers 
who used violence against Aboriginal fishers, and defying federal Fisheries officials 
who attempted to define and limit the treaty right without having obtained a judicial 
determination of whether the limits were justified. Taken aback by these events, and 
stung by the criticism of its decision, the Supreme Court used the opportunity created 
by an intervenor’s motion to issue an unusual clarifying decision justifying its earlier 
ruling and providing a more explicit statement of the limits of the treaty right.72
There may also be resistance from the Canadian public if the recognition of 
an Aboriginal or treaty right puts present activities into moral limbo. For example, 
finding an existing Aboriginal title in all or part of what we now call New Brunswick 
problematizes the legitimacy of the contemporary framework for resource and 
property allocation in the province. So the issue is not only one of contemporary 
accommodations but also of the moral foundations of the present. John Borrows 
argues that there is some reluctance to accept oral history on its own terms because it 
too poses a challenge to existing political frameworks:
The mere presentation of Aboriginal oral evidence often questions 
the very core of the Canadian legal and constitutional structure. In 
many parts of the country certain oral traditions are most relevant 
to Aboriginal peoples because they keep alive the memory of their 
unconscionable mistreatment at the hands of the British and 
Canadian legal systems. Their evidence records the “fact” that the 
unjust extension of the common law and constitutional regimes 
often occurred through dishonesty and deception, and that the loss 
of Aboriginal land and jurisdiction happened against their will and 
without their consent.73
I believe that, to the extent that the reluctance is based on this conceptual 
hurdle, it can be overcome. There was a similar reluctance to recognize that there 
was such a thing as an Aboriginal right to self-government. I remember that, in the
70 Deschênes, J.A. in his dissenting judgment in Bernard (C.A.), supra note 2 at para. 472 and Saunders 
J.A. in the concurring judgment in Marshall (logging) (C.A.), supra note 1 at para. 305 explicitly state that 
limitations on the asserted rights must be incorporated in the definition o f  the right itself, as opposed to 
being introduced at the justification stage.
71 McCallum, “Rights”, supra note 44.
72 Marshall (fishing), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533.
73 John Borrows, “Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral Traditions” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 
at 25 (“Listening for a Change”).
early eighties when the Constitution was patriated, Aboriginal self-government was a 
subject that invited derision from many of the lawyers and politicians speaking for 
the Crown. Today, of course, the federal government has recognized (in principle at 
least) that Aboriginal peoples in Canada have an inherent right to self-government 
and courts have moved from a complete denial74 to a recognition of that right.75 
While the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet found that a right of self-government 
is recognized in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,76 some judicial 
statements have begun to explore how such a right might be accommodated within 
the Canadian constitutional structure.77
If it were possible to recognize and overcome the resistance to finding 
Aboriginal title or other Aboriginal or treaty rights, and to focus instead on the 
justification question, it would be easier to distinguish between the task of historical 
inquiry and the task of finding contemporary accommodations. In doing so, courts 
could make appropriate space for direct submissions on the interests of third parties 
as well as the contemporary interests of the Aboriginal parties.
6. Addressing Contemporary Interests
The decisions in Marshall/Bernard and Mitchell are based on the historical and 
archaeological information presented as evidence at trial. Third parties could add to 
the list of historians, linguists, archaeologists, anthropologists, paleobotantists and 
others who offer expert evidence, but technically speaking, their contemporary 
interests in the resource are irrelevant to a judicial determination of whether the 
evidence provides the factual basis for a finding of Aboriginal or treaty rights. Third 
party interests, of course, are relevant, and can be addressed, in negotiations. In 
Bernard, Daigle J.A. suggested that negotiations could bring together “all the parties 
who have a stake in the resolution.”78 In Marshall (logging), Scanlan J. urged the 
parties to enter into comprehensive negotiations:
This adversarial approach does nothing to further the process of
reconciliation. Surely after waiting 240 years it is time to move on
74 McEachem C.J.B.C. found at trial in Delgamuukw that Aboriginal nations did not have law making 
power: “. .. at the time o f  Union o f  the colony with Canada in 1871, all legislative jurisdiction was divided 
between Canada and the province and there was no room for aboriginal jurisdiction or sovereignty which 
would be recognized by the law or the courts.” Delgamuukw (S.C.), supra note 25 at para. 1397.
75 Williamson J. upheld the law-making powers set out in the Nisga’a Agreement: “... aboriginal rights, 
and in particular a right to self-government akin to a legislative power to make laws, survived as one o f  
the unwritten “underlying values” o f  the Constitution outside o f  the powers distributed to Parliament and 
the legislatures in 1867.” Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General), (2000) 79 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122, 
[2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 at para. 81 (S.C.) [Campbell cited to C.N.L.R.].
76 Rights o f the Aboriginal Peoples o f Canada, Part II o f  The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11., s. 35(1): “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights o f the 
aboriginal peoples o f  Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”
77 Mitchell, supra note 57 at paras. 66-174, per Binnie J.
78 Bernard (C.A.), supra note 2 at para. 210.
and resolve the outstanding issues in a comprehensive way. The 
process of reconciliation must begin if native and non-native 
communities in this province are to move forward and prosper 
together. There are limitations in what can be done after 240 years 
but it is best to address the issues before another century goes by.79
The Supreme Court’s use of history to determine the scope of the 
Aboriginal or treaty right, however, actually discourages negotiations because it 
shifts the focus of negotiations from reaching an accommodation to establishing the 
historical and anthropological evidence that will yield the desired legal conclusion.80 
Rather than focussing on contemporary interests and arrangements, the parties focus 
on profiling the evidence of experts who may, if negotiations fail, eventually appear 
as party witnesses in a Court that will make its decision on fact and law based on 
their testimony. In other words, to use the language popular among ADR 
practitioners, negotiations will be about positions, not interests.
The solution is to separate the process of establishing and analyzing the 
historical record from the inquiry on justification. If that is done, and the parties 
know that the courts will expect to be presented with information that could justify 
infringements, negotiations will turn toward an exchange of views on potential 
contemporary accommodations regarding the allocation of natural resources. At the 
same time, courts will be able to fulfill an adjudicative role in which judges 
determine disputes if necessary, but also supervise negotiations in order to ensure 
good faith, address power imbalances, and provide for fair participation in a 
collaborative process.81
7. A Bi-national Tribunal to Adjudicate History
If the exercise of determining history is separated from the exercise of determining 
contemporary accommodation, what will happen to the history? At the present time, 
it appears that historical Aboriginal practices are only relevant to the extent that they 
provide evidence for the existence, many years ago, of a “legal” arrangement which 
corresponds to a twentieth century legal category. But Courts have also spoken of 
the need to take both Aboriginal law and common law into account, so that the 
finding and evaluation of historical fact needs to address both Aboriginal 
understandings as well as conventional sources of evidence.82 This task is not easily
79 Marshall (logging) (S.C.), supra note 1 at para. 151.
80 The points made here are discussed in more detail in Shin Imai, “Sound Science, Careful Policy 
Analysis and On-going Relationships: Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal Lands and 
Resources Disputes” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ. 587 [“Sound Science”] and Shin Imai, “Creating 
Disincentives to Negotiate: Mitchell v. M.N.R 's Potential Effect on Dispute Resolution” (2003) 22 
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 309.
81 See Imai, “Sound Science”, ibid. at 611-25.
82 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para. 48, per McLachlin C.J.C.:
The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice from the perspective o f  the
accomplished without a conscious effort to bridge cultural gaps. John Borrows 
describes the various uses of Aboriginal oral history -  both for recounting historical 
events as well as providing a normative framework for human activity -  and the 
subtlety needed to appreciate the difference.83 He then suggests that ambiguity in the 
recounting of past events is not unknown to other cultures:
If there is any hope for a more nuanced response to the 
presentation and reception of oral history, aside from key structural 
changes and/or a deeper knowledge of Aboriginal legal traditions 
and culture on the part of the judiciary, it may come from the 
observation that Canadians are somewhat familiar with the need to 
treat written histories with different lenses depending on their 
particular contexts. Most readers of documentary evidence do not 
interpret written history in a homogeneous and undifferentiated 
manner. For example, people are generally used to reading the 
Illiad, the Bible, Ramayana, Norse Sagas, and Mayan Codexes, 
and other great texts of history, as containing a mixture of literal 
and psychological facts. In analyzing these written documents 
from an historical perspective, people have long known that not 
every fact can be treated in the same manner. These texts have 
been described as poly functional: containing a plurality of factual 
insights and conveying a multiplicity of truths from different 
methodological perspectives. The acquaintance with the cultural 
contexts of these books allows readers almost unconsciously to sift 
through these books’ various factual elements. It is easier to 
analyze their different “truths” with a knowledge of the customs 
and values of the societies (or their successors) from which these 
books draw their meanings. This familiarity enables readers to 
evaluate those instances in which the literal occurrence of a past 
event is of importance for understanding the text, and when it is a 
psychological fact that the authors are attempting to convey.84
aboriginal people. But in translating it to a common law right, the Court must also 
consider the European perspective; the nature o f  the right at common law must be 
examined to determine whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it. This exercise 
in translating aboriginal practices to modem rights must not be conducted in a 
formalistic or narrow way. The Court should take a generous view o f the aboriginal 
practice and should not insist on exact conformity to the precise legal parameters o f  
the common law right. The question is whether the practice corresponds to the core 
concepts o f  the legal right claimed.
See also comments o f  Lamer C.J.C. in Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 25 at paras. 82-83.
83 Lamer C.J.C. referred to the description o f  the uses o f  oral history from the Report o f the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: “In the Aboriginal tradition the purposes o f  repeating oral accounts 
from the past is broader than the role o f  written history in the western societies. It may be to educate the 
listener, to communicate aspects o f culture, to socialize people into a cultural tradition, or to validate the 
claims o f  a particular family to authority and prestige ...” Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 25 at para. 85.
84 Borrows, “Listening for a Change”, supra note 73 at 34-35.
Freeing history from the responsibility of determining the present would 
open up a wonderful opportunity for an inquiry into history and anthropology. 
Instead of suspicious interrogation of documents and memory, there would be room 
for generous expression of cultures, practices, aspirations and beliefs. This exercise 
would be important for its own sake to correct terrible distortions of history and 
culture that have continued until very recently. In 1982, even as Canadians adopted 
constitutional amendments recognizing and affirming existing Aboriginal and treaty 
rights, a new edition of a widely-used history text celebrated the “extermination” of 
the Indians.85 In 1991, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 
as noted above, rejected the idea that Aboriginal people had law before the coming 
of Europeans.86 Overturning these historical falsehoods is a good thing in itself and 
necessary to establish a common basis for negotiations, accommodation, and 
reconciliation.
A new approach would also address another of the distortions inherent in 
the current judicial process of finding historical facts -  that of freezing the fluidity 
and ambiguity of everyday existence into a snapshot of a particular moment: the 
scintilla before contact, the moment of effective control, the instant before the treaty 
signing. These historical freeze frames are identified and appreciated not for 
themselves but because they can be manipulated into the legal framework for guiding 
contemporary policy decisions. But given a different purpose, the evidence 
produced could incorporate the ambiguity necessary to appreciate the past and 
accommodate change over time.87 The “dynamic right” approach described by 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in her dissent in Van der Peet could help “maintain 
contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the natives as their practices, 
traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall society in which they 
live.”88 The process could then become an exercise in reconciliation where different 
perspectives could be valued for the contribution they could make to the 
understanding of both the past and the present.
85 Edgar Mclnnis, Canada: A Political and Social History (Toronto: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1969) at 
10-11, stated that “The aborigines made no major contribution to the culture that developed in the settled 
communities o f Canada. ... They remained a primitive remnant clinging to their tribal organization long 
after it had become obsolete. ... In the United States, where agricultural settlement was the primary aim, 
the Indian was not only useless but an active menace whose speedy extermination would be an unqualified 
boon.” Maclnnis was honoured by being appointed a member o f  the Royal Society. The current 
generation o f  judges and politicians could have been at university when this text was published; in the 4th 
edition, published after Mclnnis’s death, these passages are repeated without change. See Edgar Mclnnis 
& Michiel Horn, Canada: A Political and Social History, 4th ed., (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
o f  Canada, 1982) at 11.
86 Delgamuukw (S.C.), supra note 1 at para. 1343, McEachem C.J.B.C.
87 Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para. 113, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting: “Aboriginal people’s 
occupation and use o f  North American territory was not static, nor, as a general principle, should be the 
aboriginal rights flowing from it. ... Accordingly, the notion o f  aboriginal rights must be open to 
fluctuation, change and evolution, not only from one native group to another, but also over time.”
88 Ibid. at para. 172, L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting.
Borrows argues that “Aboriginal elders, judges, amicus curiae, or skilled 
counsel knowledgeable in the traditions, laws, and cultures of Canadian and 
Indigenous legal systems” must share in the process of establishing and interpreting 
the historical record.89 The federal, provincial and territorial governments have 
already created some fora in which Aboriginal evidence and non-Aboriginal 
evidence is heard and evaluated by a bi-national panel. Currently, the Indian Claims 
Commission hears specific land claims made by First Nations against the federal 
Crown. While the terms of reference do not require the appointment of Aboriginal 
people, in practice, there are both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal commissioners and 
the chair at one time was Phil Fontaine, now the head of the Assembly of First 
Nations. On a broader policy level, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
appointed in 1991, held hearings throughout Canada, and produced background 
documents and a report that recommended an ambitious program of reforms. A 
majority of the seven commissioners were Aboriginal people.90 Bi-national bodies 
such as the British Columbia Treaty Commission are mandated to facilitate 
negotiations;91 other bi-national bodies address disputes arising under land claims 
agreements92 or with respect to Métis Settlements in Alberta.93
In New Zealand, land and resource disputes between the Maori and the 
pakeha (non-Maori) have been mediated through the Waitangi Tribunal, established 
in 1975 and now an important institution in New Zealand society. The legislation 
creating the Tribunal does not specify that members, who are appointed by Cabinet, 
must include a certain number of Maori, but it recognizes the importance of the 
partnership of the two parties, and in practice there has been approximately equal 
representation of Maori and pakeha.94 The panel hearing a particular case will 
consist of three to seven members with at least one of the members being Maori,
89 Borrows, “Listening for a Change”, supra note 73 at 32.
90 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, People to People, Nation to Nation: Highlights from the 
Report o f the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1996).
91 The B.C. Treaty Commission is made up o f  representatives o f  First Nations and the Crown and is 
mandated to facilitate negotiations over modem day treaties; see: <http://www.bctreaty.net/>.
92 See Nigel Bankes, “Dispute Resolution Provisions o f  Three Northern Land Claims Agreements” in 
Catherine Bell & David Kahane, eds., Intercultural Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004) 298. (Intercultural Dispute Resolution).
93 Catherine Bell, “Indigenous Dispute Resolution Systems within Non-Indigenous Frameworks: 
Intercultural Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Canada” Ibid. at 264-273.
94 Treaty o f  Waitangi Act 1975 (N.Z.), 1975/114 (available online: Public Access to Legislation Project 
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-set=pal_statutes>), accessed: 9 Feb. 2006.
s. 4(2A): In considering the suitability o f  persons for appointment to the Tribunal, 
the Minister o f Maori Affairs
(a) Shall have regard to the partnership between the 2 parties to the Treaty; and
(b) Shall have regard not only to a person’s personal attributes but also to a person’s 
knowledge o f  and experience in the different aspects o f matters likely to come 
before the Tribunal.
although usually the numbers are roughly equivalent. Hearings are held in the 
communities and procedures are adapted to respect Maori protocols.95 The 
description of the process speaks to the way in which the Tribunal operates “partly in 
the Maori world”:
By holding hearings on marae, participating in powhiri, listening to 
karanga, whaikorero and waiata, and immersing itself in a Maori 
environment, the Tribunal develops context within which to 
interpret oral and written evidence.96
The members of the Tribunal feel that this contextualization of the 
information is needed in order to approach understanding the evidence on its own 
terms.
Admittedly, creating a process for adjudicating historical evidence by a bi­
national panel would be more complicated in Canada than in New Zealand. In New 
Zealand, the task is simplified because there are many iwi (tribes) but they all 
identify as Maori and share a common language. In Canada, on the other hand, there 
are at least three Aboriginal peoples (Indians, Inuit and Métis) and many nations 
within those three peoples. Having an Inuk sit on a panel hearing evidence from the 
Haudenosaunee in southern Ontario may add nothing to the proceedings. The 
situation may be no better even if the evidence of the Haudensaunee was being heard 
by a person from a different First Nation, such as the Haida. Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended 
the establishment of an Aboriginal Lands and Treaties Tribunal which would have 
equal, or almost equal, numbers of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal members on 
decision-making panels.97
There may be concerns, even if not overtly expressed, about the impartiality 
of a tribunal which included Aboriginal people, as there were with the Royal
95 Ibid. Schedule 2, ss. 5(6)(c) and 5(9). Section 5(9) reads:
Except as expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal may regulate its procedure in 
such manner as it thinks fit, and in doing so may have regard to and adopt such 
aspects o f  te kawa o te marae as the Tribunal thinks appropriate in the particular 
case, but shall not deny any person the right to speak during the proceedings o f  the 
Tribunal on the ground o f that person’s sex.
The Maori process goes “far beyond mere trappings.” Richard Boast, “Waitangi Tribunal Procedure” in J. 
Hayward & N.R. Wheen eds., The Waitangi Tribunal (New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books, 2004) at 
54.
96 Grant Phillipson, “Talking and Writing History: Evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal” in J. Hayward & 
N.R. Wheen eds., The Waitangi Tribunal (New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books, 2004) at 41. The 
translations o f  the Maori terms: marae -  ceremonial centre o f  a particular descent group used for public 
business; powhiri -  beckoning forward, welcome; karanga -  call or summons; whaikorero -  ceremonial 
speech; waiata -  song.
97 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, “Restructuring the Relationship” in Report, vol. 2, part 2 
(Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1996) at 610.
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.98 Such concerns may limit the extent to which 
the Crown would be willing to be bound by decisions of the panel. The Waitangi 
Tribunal, while very effective in addressing and resolving conflicts, can only make 
recommendations to the Crown; it does not have binding authority. In Canada, the 
Indian Claims Commission suffers from the same limitation on its authority; it can 
only recommend resolution of specific claims to the Minister of Indian Affairs, and 
the reluctance of the Minister to implement the Commission’s recommendations is a 
major source of friction. The Aboriginal Lands and Treaties Tribunal recommended 
by the Royal Commission would have had binding authority, but the Crown has yet 
to fully embrace this notion. Instead, legislation enacted in 2003 but not yet 
proclaimed in force would provide for the creation of a Specific Claims Tribunal that 
would have binding authority but only for awards of up to ten million dollars.99 
There is no requirement that Aboriginal people be appointed to the Tribunal, 
although claimants would be given 30 days to make representations with respect to
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the appointments.
To the extent that the courts have painted themselves into a comer in 
merging their historical analysis with contemporary accommodations, a separate a 
bi-national panel to address historical and cultural issue may offer a way out. The 
report of the bi-national panel would record the factual basis for the existence of an 
Aboriginal or treaty right, leaving the issue of justification with the courts. Such a 
process could ensure an appropriate role for third parties and encourage negotiations 
rather than litigation.
8. Conclusion
I began by outlining the steps necessary for implementing Justice LeBel’s suggestion 
for staying quasi-criminal prosecutions. I suggested that, if matters are to be moved 
out of summary proceedings into full actions, the courts and the Crown must accept 
the responsibility for ensuring that Aboriginal parties have the funds necessary to 
proceed. This could be accomplished through expanded government funding 
programs and the award of costs in advance of the cause. Related to the issue of 
costs is the issue of balancing interests during the many years it will take to resolve 
the dispute. Depending on the issue, delay in finding a resolution could prejudice the 
Aboriginal party, the Crown or an interested third party, such as a municipality
98 Alan Cairns, for example, says that an anti-Canadian “parallelism” is elaborated in the Royal 
Commission report because “more than half o f  the commissioners were Aboriginal, and the Commission’s 
task was to give expression to Aboriginal constitutional ambitions.” Alan C. Cairns, Citizens Plus: 
Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) at 84. Comments such as this 
have prompted variations o f a cartoon to appear in native newspapers that depicts an exasperated Crown 
attorney complaining about the bias o f the judge and jury, who are all Indians in braids.
99 While this may seem to be a high limit, there are examples o f  egregious breaches o f  fiduciary duty 
involving valuable land in which the claim would exceed this limit. In Apsassin v. Canada (Department 
o f Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344, the First Nations claimants were 
awarded $147 million.
100 Specific Claims Resolution Act, S.C. 2003, c. 23, s. 76.1.
wanting to expand its boundaries or an entrepreneur with a natural resource 
development plan. While the Crown cannot ignore these third party interests, the 
courts and the Crown need to consider interim arrangements to maintain and 
accommodate asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights.
In order to encourage negotiations and address concerns of third parties and 
Aboriginal parties appropriately, I suggested that there must be a change in the 
application of the Sparrow test. Courts must modify their current approach to 
adjudicating Aboriginal and treaty rights, so that they do not, under the guise of 
finding historical facts, rely on history to do the job of finding contemporary 
accommodations between Aboriginal people and the rest of Canada. If the courts are 
simply stating the consequences of historical fact, there is no meaningful role for 
third parties in the litigation. A greater judicial willingness to move to the 
justification stage of the Sparrow test would likely encourage more diligent attempts 
to negotiate a working arrangement with regard to access to land and resources. If 
negotiations fail, and the parties turn to litigation, courts will have better information 
on which to determine whether an infringement of an Aboriginal or treaty right is 
justified.
Finally, I ended with what may seem to be a more ambitious proposal for 
separating out the review of history through creation of a bi-national panel to make 
determinations of historical fact. I believe that this proposal is a logical evolution 
from a commitment to ensuring that Aboriginal parties have fair and fUll hearings. It 
is important that Aboriginal history and culture be expressed and allowed to thrive 
on its own terms. The Waitangi Tribunal in New Zealand provides a good example 
of an explicitly bi-national body which can hear and appreciate both cultures. There 
are many issues to be thought through before such a body could be created in 
Canada. Would the decisions be binding, and if so, would there be an appeal? 
Should the bi-national tribunal also handle the justification stage or should that 
remain with the regular courts? While the idea may seem utopian today, we have 
come some way since 1969 and then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s “White Paper” 
which urged the abolition of Indian status and the termination of Indian-specific 
rights.101 Recent efforts to address the abuse at residential schools, recognize treaties 
and settle land claims show a willingness to re-evaluate the past. If Canada 
continues to take serious steps toward providing social, political, cultural and 
economic space to Aboriginal peoples, the idea of a bi-national panel may yet come 
to be.
101 See the Statement o f  the Government o f  Canada on Indian policy (The White Paper, 1969) online: 
<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/lib/phi/histlws/cp 1969_e.pdf>.
